CoreDirective reference architecture

what is inside the boundary, what the providers carry, and every crossing with its control

Authorization boundaryBack to portfolioClick a box for what it is, the controls it holds, and the file that proves it.
Authorization boundary one hardened host, 19 services, three Terraform modules, the configuration that changes them; Moderate baseline, 140 controls cited in the SSP Configuration items versioned here CM-2 CM-3 executed by the providers edge policy Access, WAF, tokens workflows 14 definitions, pinned policy gates 8 OPA, 4 deny, 4 warn drift check nightly re-plan, alerts Host one hardened VM, published to loopback only, three segments tunnel connector host network, read-only root; dials out, listens on nothing public host sshd net-core state, identity, orchestration n8n Squire Guardrails Postgres Vault Keycloak Teleport event shipper Langfuse web Langfuse worker ClickHouse Redis net-ai sealed Whisper Ollama no route out bridged by n8n audio never leaves net-monitoring Falco, eBPF Falcosidekick Vector Datadog agent reads the kernel below every container Runtime cloud compute, network, keys, state and backups under Terraform compute, 1 host VCN, one port object storage KMS, CMK identity domain instance identity instance identity writes backups and cannot delete them state versioned, backups on a retention rule, both under the CMK Security plane what must survive the runtime cloud, on a second provider OIDC federation evidence vault break-glass key alert on read account trail region guard evidence and backup replicas arrive one way, write-only no automatic path back; a secret read pages on-call Outside people and the front door usersbrowsers, any network edge platformAccess, WAF, tunnel operatorsworkstation, SSH, IaC Telegrambot API, on-call channel HTTPS, one-time PIN IA-2 recorded SSH, TOTP IA-2 out: tunnel, TLS SC-7 SC-8 requests ride it in configures, TLS CM-3 in: break-glass, key allowlist SC-7 MA-4 in: carve-out, IP ranges AC-3 out: notify, TLS SC-8 Inherited controls the providers carry Oracle Cloud and AWS, IaaS physical, hypervisor, backbone, resolver PE family MP-4 MP-6 SC-21 Cloudflare, edge DDoS, WAF engine, tunnel edge, DNS SC-20 SC-22 Outside external services commercial, no federal data SA-9 providers, CA-3 documented image registriesupstream images, pinned in: image pull, TLS, by digest signatures checked CM-5 SI-7 secrets managerdeploy-time injection in at deploy: TLS, env vars chmod 600, none in git IA-5 DatadogSIEM, events, logs out: TLS, agent key audit off-host AU-9 SI-4 Claude APIfrontier model out: TLS, bearer, screened from Guardrails SI-10 SA-9 embeddings APIindex and query text out: TLS, text to embed chunks and queries SA-9 web search APIenrichment out: TLS, indicator terms two nodes, skippable SA-9 GitHubrepo, runners, OIDC issuer in: signed JWT, both clouds minutes, main only IA-5 AC-6 Reading the page authorization boundary crossing point human request path agent path, screened audit, telemetry out machine identity inbound exception configures
Insideone host, 19 services, three Terraform modules, the configuration that changes them; 140 controls cited, Moderate baseline
Crossings12 drawn: direction, protocol class, control; ports and data types on the SSP copy; SA-9 providers, CA-3 links
Inheritedphysical, hypervisor, backbone, resolver, DDoS, edge DNS from the providers; six inherited SSP rows, PE family by note
Exceptionone inbound port, break-glass SSH from allowlisted sources; everything else rides a tunnel the host dials out