CoreDirective reference architecture

seven barrier layers on one hardened host, moderate baseline, sanitized, no addresses, ports, or versions

Control layersBack to portfolioClick a box for what it is, the controls it holds, and the file that proves it.
Layer Barrier NIST 800-53 Rev 5 140 controls cited Edge who reaches the origin 0 origin addresses in DNS Access login before origin WAF custom and managed DDoS absorbed off-host rate limits per IP, webhook path DNS proxy no origin address SC-7 SC-5 AC-3 SC-8 Host what listens on the host 1 inbound port, SSH only outbound tunnel no inbound listener loopback binds no interface exposed break-glass SSH allowlisted, keys CIS baseline exceptions on record no-new-privileges 18 of 19 services resource limits CPU, memory, PIDs SC-7 CM-6 CM-7 AC-6 SC-6 Runtime what a container can reach 3 networks, one sealed, no route out Falco eBPF below the workloads three networks core, ai, monitoring sealed net-ai no internet route read-only root tunnel, alert router digest pinning Renovate tiers alerts off-host shipped to the SIEM AC-4 SC-7 SI-3 SI-4 SI-7 CM-8 IR-4 Application what the agent may do 9 layers, WAF to audit trail input rails PII and injection output rails policy, schema check actions allowlist deny by default spend ceiling per alert, daily cap Langfuse trace every call recorded webhook token shared secret HITL review high and critical SI-10 SI-4 AC-3 AU-2 AU-12 SA-8 Identity who, with what, how long 4h JIT elevation, then expiry Keycloak OIDC realm roles, RBAC Teleport MFA TOTP, every session JIT elevation approved, expires session recording to SIEM over mTLS Vault DB engine 1h lease creds lockout policy failed logins alert IA-2 IA-2(1) AC-2 AC-12 IA-5 SC-12 AC-7 Data where state lives 30d retention rule on backups Postgres bridge-only, no port CMK encryption state and backups object storage state versioned nightly backup instance principal timed restore monthly, logged SC-28 SC-12 SC-13 CP-6 CP-9 CP-10 CP-4 Delivery how change arrives 8 gates, 4 deny, 4 warn pull request only path to change OIDC exchange short-lived token scanners CVE, SAST, secrets OPA gates 4 deny, 4 warn Cosign verify upstream images human review required to merge nightly drift re-plan, diff alerts CM-3 CM-5 CM-4 SA-11 RA-5 SI-7 CA-7
Outside inedge identity → WAF → tunnel dialed out → loopback, nothing listens publicly
Insidethree networks, one sealed, kernel sensor below the workloads, 18 of 19 no-new-privileges
Agentrails → allowlist → spend cap → trace, blast radius is the allowlist
ChangePR → OIDC → Trivy, Semgrep, Gitleaks → 8 gates → review → apply, drift re-plans nightly