CoreDirective reference architecture

six attacker positions, the wall that meets each one, and what remains after the walls

Threat modelBack to portfolioClick a box for what it is, the controls it holds, and the file that proves it.
internet scanner any host, no credential no origin IP in DNS Edge SC-7 I WAF, DDoS absorbed Edge SC-5 D no ports, dials out Host SC-7 S SSH allowlist only Host SC-7 D TB-1 Reaches the edge login page and the public webhook paths, never the host or its address Low D-01 S-05 webhook caller knows a public webhook path WAF and per-IP limit Edge SC-5 D edge auth, 1 carve-out Edge AC-3 S token header on Squire App IA-5 S typed payload, schema App SI-10 T recommend-only actions App AC-6 E traced, human on HIGH App AU-12 R TB-2, TB-7 Reaches one forged alert into a recommend-only pipeline; a human reads anything HIGH Medium S-01 hostile prompt attacker text in an alert PII scrubbed pre-graph App SI-10 I jailbreak and PII rail App SI-4 T output rail, citations App SI-7 T forbidden-verb filter App AC-6 E human gate on HIGH App IR-4 E spend cap, traced App AU-12 R TB-5 Reaches the allowlist: text advice, no action executes; 20 cases fired, 0 bypasses Medium T-01 I-01 compromised container code running in one service three bridge networks Runtime AC-4 E no-new-privs, 1 exempt Runtime CM-7 E socket: 2 sensors only Runtime AC-6 E Falco reads the kernel Runtime SI-4 E secrets need a token Identity IA-5 I DB needs a credential Data AC-3 I TB-4 Reaches its own segment and env; host escape needs a kernel zero-day and lands in Falco Medium E-04 E-01 S-03 stolen credential a password or a laptop one-time PIN at edge Edge IA-2 S second factor on SSH Host IA-2 S JIT expires in 4h Identity AC-12 E quarterly role review Identity AC-2 E recorded, shipped mTLS Identity AU-9 R TB-1 TB-2 Reaches a recorded session with a four hour clock; evidence lands beyond their reach Low R-02 E-03 poisoned image a tag nobody here built digest pinned, Tier 1 Delivery CM-5 T reviewed PR to change Delivery CM-3 T scan, SBOM, signature Delivery RA-5 T sealed: no route home Runtime AC-4 I Reaches a poisoned tag needs a reviewed PR; a bad runtime has no route home Low T-05 T-03 By the numbers 29 STRIDE threats across 8 trust boundaries 7 attack paths, 4 platform, 3 AI 10 AI threats cataloged, OWASP LLM and ATLAS 20 red-team cases fired, 0 bypasses 11 pentest findings, 0 critical, 4 accepted 0 application ports open to the internet STRIDE S spoofing T tampering R repudiation I information disclosure D denial of service E elevation of privilege Reading the page the attack, top to bottom what remains after a wall wall that stops it, STRIDE letter sees it, cannot be silenced inside trust boundary crossed, register ID residual after controls, register IDs
MethodSTRIDE per trust boundary, attack trees per AI path, two red-team cycles fired at production
Readingtop to bottom is the attack, each bar is a wall, dashed is what remains, chip is residual after controls
DetectionFalco from the kernel, logins and sessions off-host over mTLS, every model call traced
ResidualMEDIUM carries a named mitigation or acceptance; the one High in the platform register (I-02) is re-rated Moderate by the risk register; reviewed quarterly